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ACCIDENTAL AND ESSENTIAL CONNECTIONS 
BETWEENETHICALANDLEGALNORMS 
Juha-Pekka Rentto 
One of the grand topics of the 20th century legal philosophy 
was the relationship between law and morality: Are the two 
normative orders autonomously separate from each other, or is 
law an institutionalized moral order? Are overlapping connec-
tions between legal and moral norms logically contingent, or is 
there a logically necessary relationship between the two? Is the 
relationship between law and morality accidental or essential? 
These are only a few possible renderings of the problem at stake. 
The general tone of the debate was determined by those why 
.. 
denied an essential, or necessary, relationship. The proposed 
sources for such a denial were many, the oldest one being the 
voluntaristic tradition of legal positivism which always, ever 
since the ancient Romans, had c1aimed that it is nothing but the 
will of the lawgiver which makes valid law. Another source was 
the Weberian philosophy of the "modern" state which built on the 
idea that in a developed "modern" state the legal order had 
completely disentangled itself from the moral order and become 
an autonomous and self-sufficient normative system. Similar 
ideas appeared in Talcott Parson's notion of social development 
as a process of adaptive upgrading in which social subsystems 
gradually were specialized and differentiated from each other. 
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A further source was the Kelsenian "pure jurisprudence" which 
underlined the logical completeness of the norm hierarchy of 
legal rules. 
The Anglosaxon school of analytical jurisprudence, headed by 
H.L.A. Hart, made a point of showing that there is no logical 
connection between the concepts of law and morality, so that the 
law may have any content quite regardless whether it meets any 
moral standard, and is still fully valid law. A background factor 
common to several versions of the denial was the logical 
positivism of the Vienna school, a latter day version of 
ontological nominalism for the greater glory of natural science: 
according to it traditional ethics was pointless because its 
statements could not be empirically verified. Consequently sorne 
sympathisers, like the Scandinavian realists, conceived of the law 
as a sheer social or psychological fact, which stripped it of moral 
undertones. Others, like Hart, carne to look at morality primarily 
as a factual normative order, a positive morality, which in its own 
way marginalized whatever connection there might be between 
that which happens to be positivily valid morality and that which 
happens to be positively valid law. "What happens to be valid 
law" is indeed a key expression in the present context: the 
worldwide upsurge of representative democracy during the 20th 
century was accompanied with a widely accepted political 
philosophy which maintained that one of the prerequisites for a 
functioning democracy is that the law may have any content as 
long as it represents the will of the legislative majority. Pre-
positive moral constraints on the material content of law appeared 
in the eyes of many incompatible with democratic government l. 
l. Note, though, that Carlos Santiago Nino makes an ingenious attempt at 
showing how democracy makes laws moral, providing thereby quite on the 
contrary a link between law and morality; see his Derecho, moral y política. 
Una revisión de la teoría general del Derecho, Ariel, Barcelona, 1994, p. 161 
pp. In the context of this essay we cannot engage in a discussion on the 
morality of democracy; for a divergent view, see e.g. Alberto MONTORO 
THE CONCEPT AND MORALITY OF LA W 181 
In a way the question conceming the relationship between law 
and morality was very close to another great dispute of the 20th 
century, namely the Is-Ought question between legal positivists 
and jusnaturalists: whether legal Ought is to be derived -or 
derivable- from sorne Is of natural morality or the like. It is 
therefore hardly surprising that many of the legal philosophers 
who challenged the mainstream dogma and supported an 
essential, or necessary, relationship between law and morality 
were -like Lon Fuller with his "intemal morality of law", and the 
new Aristotelians and Thornists most notably exemplified by the 
"new school of jusnaturalism" headed by Gerrnain Grisez and 
John Finnis- in one way or another sympathetic to jusnaturalistic 
views. Their contributions to the discussion show that the 
essential question as it was framed in the 20th century differed, 
deep down, very little from the one po sed by Plato and Aristotle: 
whether the conceptual essence of law is to promote the cornrnon 
good, or whether it is nothing but an arbitrary order imposed by 
the strong on the weak, democratically or otherwise. 
Below we shall first look at sorne of the common arguments 
proffered for holding that legal and moral norrns are different 
from each other. Then we shalllook more closely at H.L.A. Hart's 
argument for holding that even if there are connections and 
sirnilarities between legal and moral norms, they still will not 
imply a necessary relationship between the two. Finally, we shall 
try to construe an intelligent reply to the analytical position in 
order to show that views like Hart's are crucially dependent on 
certain metaphysical presuppositions which no one is under an 
obligation to share, and that if one chooses a different worIdview 
it is also natural to as sume that there must be an essential 
relationship between law and morality. For this purpose we shall 
discuss Lon Fuller as en examplary opponent to Hart, and also 
BALLESTEROS, "Razones y límites de la legitimación democrática del 
Derecho". in Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho XIX, pp. 119-182. 
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have a closer look at Carlos Santiago Nino's posthumous 
contribution to the debate. 
1. LA W AND MORALITY AS DIFFERENT NORMA TIVE ORDERS 
It is obvious that law and morality are not identical: they are 
two different normative orders with different functions and 
characteristics. Our question is whether these differences justify 
the conclusion drawn by many philosophers that law and morality 
are conceptually andlor essentially independent from each other. 
To employ H.L.A. Hart's terminology, we ask ourselves whether 
morality in any way defines the very concept of law. In 
Aristotelian terms we might paraphrase the question as follows: is 
law essentially moral? Aristotle's answer according to which law 
is an essentially moral enterprise is the implicit starting-point of 
the whole discussion. Hart, again, reflected the mainstream of 
modernity when he wanted to deny a conceptual link between law 
and morality. We shall begin our quest by looking at the 
differences between the two normative orders pointed out by Hart 
in his highly influential "The Concept of Law"2. There, the 
fundamental difference is summarized in terms of "external" and 
"internal" behaviour: the law deals with the former, whereas 
morality concentrates on the latter. While Hart wants to dismiss 
the more simplistic formulations of this difference, he proceeds to 
show that there is "something of importance" hidden in them, 
summarizing it under four. headings3. 
First, a closer analysis suggests to Hart that moral norms are 
usually considered of central importance for social life, whereas 
2. H.L.A. HART, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1961, p. 169 pp. For Kelsen's view, which preceded Hart's and against which 
Hart partly directs his arguments, see e.g. Eusebio FERNÁNDEZ, Teoría de 
justicia y derechos humanos, Debate, Madrid, 1991 (1984), p. 50 pp. 
3. HART, ibidem p. 168. 
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legal norms need not be important for the very survival of 
society. True, sorne legal norms deal with extremely important 
matters, but such norms form only a fraction of modem 
legislation, most of which is concemed with moraHy indifferent 
questions and formal details. Hart seems to think that this 
difference is essential4. His conclusion can be challenged, though, 
by pointing out with Rudolf Stranzinger5 that differences between 
law and morality can be of various kinds: not every difference is 
specific (a property constitutes a species by being shared by all 
members of one kind and none of the other), but sorne of them 
are typical without being specific ("arthaufig": only members of 
one kind have a property, but not aH of them), or characteristic 
without being specific (aH members of one kind have a property, 
but also sorne members of the other kind), or inessential (a 
property is shared by sorne members of both kinds but not by all 
members of either kind). Where the difference in importance is 
concemed, one should realize that moral norms are usually more 
abstract than legal norms, wherefore it is only to be expected that 
when a person applies the law he will not usually have to think of 
the basic principIes which perhaps underly the applied norms. 
Indeed a central purpose of lawmaking is to facilitate judgment 
by making it unnecessary to resort to the first principIes every 
time. But this by no means implies that the first principIes do not 
exist, or that they are not moral. Hence the difference seems to be 
just a matter of relative closeness to the first principIes, and 
thereby inessential. 
Secondly, moral norms are immune from deliberate change by 
human fiat, whereas it is in the very nature of law that legal 
norms can be changed at will by the lawmaker. Moral norms, 
4. Op. cit., p. 170 p. 
5. See Rudolf STRANZINGER, "Recht und Moral: ihre Unterschiede und 
Zusammenhlinge", in lus humanitatis. Festschrift für Alfred Verdross (ed. 
Herbert Miehsler, Erhard Mock, Bruno Simma & lImar Tammelo), Duncker & 
Humblot, Berlin, 1980 (pp. 247-262), p. 249. 
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again, are not changed, but changes take place in them over time. 
In slightly different words, Heinrich Geddert identifies the 
difference in question as one stemming from the respective 
sources of law and morality6: legal norms are deliberately 
legislated whereas moral norms are not. AIso this difference 
seems essential to Hart7. But he seems to look thereby at la\\( as a 
merely formal notion: it is quite obvious that, in a formal sense, 
laws are passed and abolished in a way in which moral norms 
cannot. This shows that law and morality are different, but 
overlooks that laws can be looked at from other viewpoints, too: 
Authors like H.T. KIami have pointed out that law is not only a 
normative but also a factual, or normal, order8. Given that, it is 
obvious that a change in the normative order by no means effects 
an immediate change in the normal order. Customary law is a 
case in point. Similarly, if one holds -like those who support a 
Realesque multidimensional view of law9- that the law has an 
evaluative or moral aspect, too, it is equally clear that the basic 
structure of that aspect changes much more slowly than the 
formally Iegislated norms. The difference in question can be 
essential in a specific sense only if one defines law as nothing but 
a product of positive enactment. But quite clearly that would be 
begging the question. Otherwise the difference is typical without 
being specific, or even inessential if we take into account that 
sometimes people do deliberately change their moral habits, too. 
6. Heinrich GEDDERT, Recht und Moral. Zum Sinn eines alten Problems, 
Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1984, p. 90 pp. 
7. Op. cit., p. 173. 
8. Hannu Tapani KLAMI, "The Dualism of Law", in Objektivierung des 
Rechtsdenkens. Gedachtnisschrift für Ilmar Tammelo (ed. Werner Krawietz, 
Theo Mayer-Maly & Ota Weinberger), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1984, 
pp. 471-480. 
9. On such doctrines, see e.g. Seppo LAAKSO, Über die Dreidimen-
sionalitat des Rechts und des juristischen Denkens. Überlegungen zu einer 
syntetisch-argumentativen Rechtswissenschaft, The University of Tampere, 
Tampere, 1980. 
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It is possible to refine the argument from the source of legal 
and moral norms by ceding that in a way both can be legislated, 
but at the same time pointing out that they have different 
legislators lO: where legal norms are heteronomously legislated by 
someone else for the agents who are their subjects, moral norms 
are autonomously legislated by the agents who are their subjects 
for themselves11 . But even in this form the difference fails to be 
specific, as it overlooks not only the modem notion of 
intemalized legal norms but the entire Aristotelian tradition 
which holds that a govemment by law is fundarnentally an 
autonomous self-govemment of the citizens. One might also 
question the autonomy of the moral agent by pointing out that it 
is quite unusual for a moral doctrine to hold that agents actually 
invent their own standards: moral norms are generally believed to 
be given to the agent, and his autonomy is reduced to the act of 
making them his own, i.e. of intemalizing them. Besides, positive 
morality is as heteronomous as positive law can ever be. Hence 
the difference must be inessehtial even in this form. - But one can 
still reforge the argument at hand and claim that it is an essential 
difference between law and morality that the former is created by 
the state, whereas the latter was bom and develops in a broader 
social context12. Nevertheless it is obvious that the state is not 
everything the law requires in order to gain reality: e.g. 
customary law is not created by the state even in the first place. 
Intemalization does not take place by the lawgiver's fiat. On the 
other hand, the state can, and can hardly avoid to, promote certain 
moral standards. As long as we look at this version of the 
argument merely in terms of who or what is the lawgiver, it is 
10. See GEDDERT, op. cit., p. 95 pp. 
11. See Vladimír KUBES, "Jurisprudenz und Ethik", in Archiv für Rechts-
und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft Neue Folge 13: Wissenschaften und Philosophie 
als Basis der Jurisprudenz (ed. Franz Rotter, Ota Weinberger & Franz 
Wieacker), Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1980 (pp. 165-180), p. 169. 
12. GEDDERT, ibidem. 
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really not much different from Isidorus of Seville's c1assification 
of ancient Roman laws according to the last name of the person 
who drafted the piece of legislation in question 13, and equally 
inessential. A more interesting way of putting the argument 
would depart from the Aristotelian notion of law being the 
required method of organizing precisely the state and no other 
kind of community. But as we shall see towards the end of this 
essay, no essential difference between law and morality can be 
maintained from that viewpoint, either, because it explicitly 
conceives of the state as an institution for an essentially moral 
purpose. 
Thirdly, Hart argues that an aspect of the essential difference 
between law and morality is that the law can be broken by 
objectively illegal external acts without regard to whether the 
subjective internal intention of the agent is blameworthy, whereas 
an action can only be morally blameworthy only if it is 
accompanied by a blameworthy intention l4. Morally, a 
demonstrated good intention -as well as a demonstrated 
incapacity for having a blameworthy intention at all- always 
removes blame, whereas in law it is not necessarily so, even if 
intentions usually play a role in criminal and torts law. 
Nevertheless, as even Hart points out, the difference between law 
and morality is not sharp on this point: it is not possible to draw 
from this the conc1usion that morality is interested in intentions 
alone, while the law is interested in external actions alone. Both 
are concerned with both, but with different priorities in mindl5. 
An action as defined by law can indeed be unlawful in the 
abstract while an individual action which matches the universal 
description can at the same time be lawful, because it is either 
excusable or justified due to special circumstance, and moral 
reasoning works much in the same way. But Hart fails to 
13. See Etyrnol. V, 15 (Patrologia latina 82, 201). 
14. HART, op. cit., p. 173 pp. 
15. See p. 174. 
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underline the fact that the reasons which sometimes can make an 
unlawful action excusable or justified are fundamentally moral, 
which points to an intimate connection rather than to a difference 
between law and morality. We should also add that' different 
moral doctrines give a different weight to subjective intentions: 
for utilitarians, the consequences of the action are the m~st 
important factor, whereas for Aristotelians and Thomists the 
decisive factor is the objective intension of an action rather than 
the subjective intention of the agent. Only in a Kantian morality 
can everything turn on the agent's intention. This insight 
highlights the point made by Stranzinger that a claim of 
difference between law and morality often is only a claim of 
difference between a certain conception of law and a certain 
conception of moralityl6. 
If we shift attention from the agent's intentions to the 
lawgiver's intentions, it is possible to make an analogous claim: it 
is the lawgiver's intention to regulate external human action, 
while morality pays primary attention to internal actions and 
attitudes l7. This claim enjoys a certain plausibility, but it is 
obviously just a matter of degree: most laws are more intrested in 
external behaviour than in internal motives, and many moral 
norms are more interested in internal motives than external 
behaviour, but quite obviously internal motives are far from 
irrelevant for many laws (just think of notions like "good faith" 
or "criminal intent"), and equally obviously external behaviour is 
morally relevant in many cases. It is worth noting that the 
classical tradition of moral philosophy even divides morality in 
16. STRANZINGER,op. cit., p. 248 p.; cf. NINO, op. cit., pp. 17-42, where 
the author goes so far as to c1aim that the whole question concerning a 
conceptual relationship between law and morality is pointless for this reason. 
17. See KUBES, op. cit., p. 168 p.; cf. Geddert: op. cit., p. 130 pp., and 
STRANZINGER, op. cit., p. 251 pp. 
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virtues with an internal mean of excellence, like temperance and 
fortitude, and those with an external mean, like justice18. 
This last notion brings us to an alternative version of the 
argument, presented by Kubes: that law seeks to direct human 
relations, whereas morality seeks to direct human s in their 
individual capacity19. In different words, law directs people in 
their role of citizens, whereas morality is relevant for their other 
roles2o. Part of this claim is evidently true: laws are passed for the 
purpose of regulating human actions inasmuch as they are 
relevant for the common good of the entire society. For this 
reason laws mainly deal with civil relations, wherefore justice, 
with its external mean, is naturally the supreme moral 
consideration in the realril of law. Indeed the ancients included 
this very notion in the definition of law2I , regarding it a specific 
and essential property which makes law what it is, i.e. law. Even 
so, this will not imply that it is not part and parcel of morality to 
be concerned for the common good and for justice in human 
relations. True, classical morality can be characterized as agent-
centred, i.e. concerned for the personal excellence of the agent22. 
But even then this personal excellence is far from an individual 
matter: it is in an important manner defined by the justified 
expectations placed on a person according to the roles he 
occupies in society. And if we look at modern moral theories, 
they tend to be explicitly patient-centred: even if it is the action of 
an individual which is evaluated by moral standards, the aspect 
which is usually considered morally relevant in an action is 
precisely that which has an impact on others. As a consequence, 
18. See St. THOMAS, Summa theologite la IIa: 64,2. 
19. KUBES, ibidem. 
20. Cf. GEDDERT, op. cit., p. 145 pp. 
21. See e.g. Summa theologite la na: 90,2 and 96,1; At the same time they 
made a point of assuring that even then the law was in principIe concerned for 
all moral virtues, even those with an internal mean, inasmuch as they were in 
any way related to the common good, see Summa theologia: la IIa: 96,3. 
22. Or eudaimonistic, as this way of conceiving of morality is often called. 
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the present argument points to a characteristic difference between 
law and morality: it is necessary for laws to be concerned for 
what we do under the aspect of social interaction and community, 
whereas it is not necessary for moral norms but only sorne of 
them have a social concern. This clearly divides law and morality 
into different species -but fails to show that one is not the 
subspecies of the other, or that the two do not belong to the same 
genus. 
A fOUJ;th aspect of the difference between law and morality 
according to Hart has to do with sanctions: pressure to moral 
conformity is internal, whereas pressure to legal compliance is 
external. In other words, the typical sanction for a moral 
transgression is a pang of the transgressor's own conscience, 
whereas sanctions for legal offences are administered by external 
authorities23. Hart does not deny that external sanctions 
sometimes apply to breaches of the moral code, too. But on the 
other hand he fails to appreciate the bad conscience one can get 
for breaking the law if one has internalized the law in the way 
suggested abo ve. Geddert again proposes that we should 
distinguish between various claims24: That laws are always 
sanctioned, or that moral norms are always unsanctioned, are 
patently false claims. Closer to the truth is that laws are generally 
sanctionable in that the law usually provides for sanctions for 
offences against the law, but it is a different matter altogether 
whether these sanctions will in fact be applied. Morality is clearly 
sanctionable, too, but moral sanctions are usually different from 
legal sanctions in that they are not backed up by formal 
institutions25 . Yet is is by no means unthinkable that a formal 
23. HART, op. cit., p. 175 p.; cf. Stranzinger, op. cit., p. 254 p., where the 
argument is that laws are sanctioned, whereas moral norms lack sanctions. 
24. GEDDERT,op. cit., p. 177 pp. 
25. Cf. Conrad JOHNSON, "Positivism and the Institutional Character of 
Law and Morality", in Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 23: 
Tradition and Progress in Modern Legal Cultures - Tradition und Fortschritte 
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authority is instituted for the purpose of administering moral 
sanctions. And Robert Alexy clearly argues in his Sonderfall-
thesis that law is fundamentally a special kind of morality, 
institutionalized for the purpose of providing the society with a 
forceful method of overcoming sorne of the practical 
shortcomings of the moral discourse26. 
It all seems to boil down to the rather evident notion that the 
administration of law is formalized in a way in which morality is 
not. Similarly, the validity of law has formal criteria which do not 
apply to the validity of moral standards27: laws can be valid in a 
formal, or constitutional, sen se even when they lack factual 
validity, i.e. efficacy, and ideal validity, i.e. moral acceptability, 
or reasonableness. On the other hand, moral standards can only 
be valid if they are reasonable standards. We are back where we 
began: laws usually have a formal source which moral norms 
lack. But what is the source for the validity of the constitution? A 
Grundnorm perhaps? But why is the Grundnorm valid? Instead 
of showing that law and morality are hereby essentially or 
conceptually unrelated, this point should rather lead us to the 
insight that the legal institutions, if they are not to exist for their 
own sake and therefore to be pointless, have a moral raison 
d'etre28 : they are needed because morality is unable to organize a 
society effectively on its own. As a consequence it would seem 
in den modernen revchtskulturen (ed. Stig J~rgensen, Juha Poyhonen & Csaba 
Varga), Franz Steiner verlag, Stuttgart, 1985 (p. 13-17). 
26. See Robert ALEXY, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Die 
Theorie des rationalen Diskurses als Theorie der juristischen Begründung, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1983 (1978), p. 263 pp. & 349 pp. 
27. See GEDDERT, op. cit., p. 107 pp.; ef. Aulis AARNIO, "On the 
Validity, Effieaey and Aeeeptability of Legal Norms", in Objektivierung des 
Rechtsdenkens. Gediichtnisschrift für Ilmar Tammelo (ed. Werner Krawietz, 
Theo Mayer-Maly & Ota Weinberger), Duneker & Humblot, Berlin, 1984 
(pp. 427-438). 
28. Even KUBES, who otherwise holds law and morality separate orders, 
thinks it is neeessary for the validity of a legal order that it be validated by a 
moral order, see op. cit., p. 169 & 178. 
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that an important difference between law and morality resides in 
the former being always a means to further ends and never and 
end in itself whereas the latter can give expression for 
unconsequential considerations which are ends in themselves. But 
even if this were the case, it will not remove the possibility that 
the ends to which it is the essence of law to be a means are 
ultimately moral. 
The discussion so far clearly points towards the rather trivial 
conclusiqn that while law and morality are different species, they 
share the function of directing human action, whereby they are 
related to each other. The answer to the question whether the 
relation is conceptual in the sen se that the concept of law includes 
a moral definiens is inconclusive so far. It seems to depend a lot 
on how one chooses to define law or morality whethet this can be 
the case or not. We should not be overly hasty in accepting the 
conclusion of Nino according to which the question is thereby 
uninteresting and even pointless29. This is namely true only if we 
accept his high-handed . denial of what he calls conceptual 
essentialism30. 
Instead of using the historically laden terms "nominalism" -or 
"conventionalism"- and "conceptualism" we choose to 
distinguish between those who define the concept of "concept" in 
an extensional manner, and those who define it in an intensional 
manner. The extensional approach, favoured by the analytical 
school, basically points out that this is a law and that is a law and 
that is a law, too; and this is a moral norm and that is a moral 
norm and that is a moral norm, too; and sorne of these laws do 
not match any moral norm, and sorne of these moral norms do not 
match any law; therefore the extensions of law and morality do 
not cover one another; therefore they are not conceptually related, 
either. But this is not a commonplace understanding of the 
29. See NINO, op. cit., p. 41 p. 
30. lbidem p. 28 pp. 
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concept of "concept". Usually we hold that concepts are 
normative in that a thing must meet certain criteria in order to be 
accepted as a genuine representative· of a given concept31 . From 
this perspective concepts appear intensional: they are based on a 
piece of information which tells us what it is that makes a thing 
what it is, i.e. its intension, or point. If the law has a moral point, 
then those "laws" which fail to meet the requisite moral criteria 
fail to be law, too, in the proper sense of the word. Those who 
believe that it makes no sense to think that law lacks intension, 
and is thereby pointless, can hardly be expected to accept that the 
concept of law is a matter of convention, wherefore there is -and 
can be- no correct definition of law. Quite clearly Hart -and Nino 
for that matter- are equally unwilling to accept that law is 
pointless. Therefore, des pite the fact that they both support the 
view that there is no necessary conceptual connection between 
law and morality, they proceed to discuss several connections 
between the conceptually separate normative orders which they 
acknowledge as important even if they maintain that they are not 
conceptually or essentially necessary32. 
2. CONNECTIONS BETWEEN LA W AND MORALITY 
Having denied the possibility of a conceptually necessary 
relationship between law and morality, Hart argues that they 
nevertheless have a close contingent relationship, based on the 
fundamental characteristics of human society which make the 
institution of a legal order practically necessary. This necessity, 
together with the social factors which cause it, Hart jocularly calls 
"the minimum content of Natural Law"33. 
31. See Peter SIMPSON, "Politics and Human Nature", in The American 
J ournal of J urisprudence Vol. 31 , pp. 79-96. 
32. HART,op. cit., p. 189 pp.; NINO, op. cit., p. 43 pp. 
33. HART, op. cit., p. 189 pp. 
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The factors which make it practically necessary for any human 
society to found a normative order of law are five: (i) human 
beings are vulnerable and need protection in order to survive; (ii) 
human beings have approximately egual capacities, so that it is 
not possible for anyone to impose a permanent order on others by 
relying on his personal strength or clevemess alone; (iii) human 
beings tend to be selfish rather than altruistic in that they are 
often willing to take advantage of a favourable circumstance at 
the cost of their fellows; (iv) the resources available to any human 
society are limited, so that in the end the allocation of resources 
between individuals is a zero-sum game; and (v) human 
understanding is limited, and the human will is prone to 
weakness. The result of all this is that in the state of nature, as it 
were, human interaction tends to be competitive and individual 
life and property unsafe. Therefore, in order to make a peaceful 
and ordered life possible, social interaction must be organized by 
instituting a permanent order. Such an order, again, can best be 
instituted by the rule of law. Therefore, if human society is to be 
viable, it is practically necessary that it be organized with a 
coercive legal order which prevents -to use a Hobbesian notion-
a war of everyone against everyone from breaking out. 
That this rather Hobbesian notion is applicable to Hart's 
"minimum content" shows that his "Natural Law" is "natural" 
merely in the same sense as Hobbes' account of law can be called 
a theory of "natural law": it shows, given that his pessimistic 
view of mankind is true34, that a coercive legal order is necessary 
34. Cf. John FINNIS, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Clarndon Press, 
Oxford, 1980, p. 231 pp., where the author points out that it is not necessary to 
as sume that it is in the nature of human beings to treat each other badly in order 
to come to the conclusion that they need a normative order in order to organize 
their many pursuits and callings into a manageable whole. Cf. etiam Steven 
LUKES, "Taking Morality Seriously", in Morality and Objectivity. A Tribute to 
J. L. Mackie (ed. Ted Honderich), Int'1 Library of Philosophy, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London 1985 (pp. 98-109), p. 101 pp., where it is argued that a 
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for survival. If one accepts the value judgment that being coerced 
to survival is better for human beings than being at liberty to win 
or to lose in the battlefield, "the minimum content" may even 
justify that an order be instituted which is strong enough to 
maintain peace. But it can hardly have much to say about the 
substantive content of the order in question, as Gregorio Peces-
Barba also points out35 . And Otfried HOffe is in his right to say 
that we can hardly be satisfied with justifying the mere existence 
of a legal order: the actual content of every particular legal order 
cries for justification36. And it is only natural to expect that such 
a justification be a moral one which distinguishes between a good 
and abad order, or -in ancient terms- between state and tyranny. 
Perhaps anticipating this objection, Hart brings up a number of 
aspects under which it has been claimed that morality is essential 
to law, with a view to showing why these claims fail to 
demonstrate a conceptually necessary relationship between law 
and morality, even if sorne of them rightly point at a significant, 
even if contingent, connection37. The first topic Hart takes up is 
the obligatory authority of law: according to him a professed 
obligation to respect the authority of the law is not always based 
on moral considerations38 . More often than not, people make 
their decision to abide by the law on other than moral grounds: 
e.g. for prudential reasons, or out of fear. Therefore it is quite 
conception of limited altruism like Hart's presupposes a conflict of interests 
rather than creates it. 
35. Gregorio PECES-BARBA, Introducción a la Filosofía del Derecho, 
Debate, Madrid, 1983, p. 315 p. ef. HART, op. cit., p. 195, where unc\ear 
reference is made to "minimum forms of protection... which are 
.. .indispensable features of municipallaw". 
36. See Otfried HOFFE, "Das Naturrecht angesichts der Herausforderung 
durch den Rechtspositivismus", in Das Naturrrechtsdenken heute und morgen. 
Geddchtnisschrift für Réné Marcic (ed. Dorothea Mayer-Maly & Peter M. 
Simons), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1983 (pp. 303-335), p. 307 pp. 
37. HART,op. cit., p. 195 pp. 
38. Ibidem p. 198 p. 
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enough for law that it oblige the subjects coercively, and it is in 
no way conceptually necessary for it to be morally intemalized or 
intemalizable by them. -An obvious reply to Hart would be that 
the psychological motives which legal subjects actually hold for 
their decisions can hardly have much relevance for the question 
whether it is in the essence of law that it ought to be based on 
moral premisses in order to be valido It is also important to 
distinguish between obliging and obligatory39: a piece of 
legislation can very well be formally valid and actually effective 
and thereby obliging, even if it were not valid in a moral sense 
which made it genuinely obligatory. The question conceming 
"iniquitous law" is a case in point40: Hart thinks it is to the 
advantage of legal science to hold that laws are laws, and thereby 
inc1uded within the scope of its discipline, even if they are 
immoral. But this is a mere terminological trick: it makes little 
practical difference whether we call morally defective laws 
"laws" or something else. 
On the contrary, the important question should be whether 
there is something in the very enterprise of organizing a society 
with law which makes the validity of laws depend on their 
relationship to moral standards. Thereby we should distinguish 
between several levels of inquiry: An individual law can c1early 
be legally valid in a non-moral sense even if it were not valid on 
its own merits in a strictIy moral sense. The legal order as a 
whole, again, can hardly be legally valid in any way which were 
not constitutive of a vicious circ1e, and if it is to have a 
39. ef. ibidem p. 18 pp., where Hart discusses the difference between a 
gunman and a lawgiver. There he wants to make the distinction between 
obliging and obligatory without taking recourse to moral considerations. As 1 
interpret it, his distinction depends on the notion that the law is institutionalized 
in a way which a gunman's orders are not. But to my mind this trick only 
moves the problem to a different level: if a legal arder is institutionalized by a 
habituation which in turn is merely based on sheer force, does it reaI1y differ 
from a gunman in any essential respect? 
40. See ibidem p. 203 pp. 
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meaningful validity at all, it must needs derive from sorne extra-
legal consideration, most likely a moral value. If a legal order as a 
whole is morally valid, it can as a consequence constitute a 
general reason for the subjects at large to hold the laws at large 
within that order as prima Jade legally valid in a sense which is 
not merely obligeing but also morally obligatory. The immorality 
of a particular piece of legislation may sometimes overtum this 
assumption of legal validity in a moral sense, but even then, an 
individual subject may, for strictly moral reasons, have a 
particular duty to submit to the requirements of the morally 
defective law in the particular situation at hand41 . In this way, if 
we are to use a meaningful notion of legal obligation which 
differs from being obliged by coercion, the fundamental 
prerequisite for it will always be moral. 
Hart admits that morality undoubtedly has a bearing on law in 
that it influences the content of legislation: legal norms often 
reflect prevalent moral norms42. But they do not always do it, 
which shows that this influence is conceptually contingent. It is 
only factually indispensable for the law, if it is to to create a 
stable order in society, that it meet the prevalent moral standards 
to a degree which is sufficient in the present circumstances. But 
here we should note how admirably Hart fits the category of those 
who define "concept" extensionally, not intentionally. If one 
accepts a purposive view of law, like Lon Fuller43, one will tend 
to read a purpose into the very concept of "law" and not merely 
particular purposes to particular laws. Then it is not sufficient to 
point out that not every particular law has a particular moral 
purpose, for the law as a whole might still have one. 
Hart admits that morality affects the interpretation of law, due 
to its open texture, and to the requirements of justice on judicial 
41. As already Aquinas pointed out in la !Ice 96,4: lniustce autem sunt. 
42. Op. cit., p. 199 p. 
43. Lon FULLER, The Morality of Law, Yale University Press, New 
Raven, CT 1965, p. 96. 
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procedure44. Here his argument against a necessary relationship is 
sociological: he points out that even if moral considerations are 
important for judicial reasoning, they have historically been 
"honoured nearly as much in the breach as in the observance". In 
much the same way he disvalues the insight that morality can be 
used for a critical evaluation of law: it cannot constitute a 
necessary relationship because people in fact more often disagree 
than agree on how laws ought to be morally evaluated45 . But it is 
hardly the same thing to say that moral standards have in fact 
often been broken in the administration of the law, or that the 
evaluation of laws according to moral standards is more often 
than not subject to disagreement, as to say that moral standards 
do not constitute a necessary part of legal reasoning and 
interpretation, or that the proper standards for evaluating law are 
not necessarily based on moral considerations. Indeed, the 
modern philosophy of hermeneutics has quite clearly shown that 
there is no way of arriving at a practical legal interpretation 
without at least implicitly employing evaluative criteria46. And 
clearly there is no point of even talking about evaluation, unless it 
takes place with reference to values. In order to maintain that 
such an evaluation can be performed without implicit and 
ultimate reference to moral values one must discard the very idea 
that the purpose of evaluation is to distinguish between that 
which is truly right and that which is truly wrong and embrace a 
pluralistic conception of value which denies the possibility that 
sorne, i.e. moral, values are more important than others47. 
44. Op. cit., p. 200 p. 
45. Op. cit., p. 201 p. 
46. See RENTIO, "Between Clarence Thomas and Saint Thomas. 
Beginnings of a Moral Argument for Judicial Jusnaturalism", in Uc. Davis 
Law Review, Vol. 26 (1993) (pp. 727-767), p. 741 pp. 
47. Cf. Adalbert PODLECH, "Recht und Moral", in Rechtstheorie 1972 
(pp. 129-148),p. 136p. 
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In his discussion, Hart makes one seeming concession: 
perhaps there is a necessary connection between law and morality 
in that a certain mínimum of justice is necessarily involved 
whenever laws are used for directing and controlling human 
behaviour48. He refers to the Anglo-Saxon conception of "Natural 
Justice", which consists of principIes related to the formal justice 
and impartiality which are considered essential for legal 
procedure, and says that if this is what is meant by the necessary 
connection between law and morality, he is ready to accept the 
c1aim. Nevertheless, it is "compatible with very great iniquity". In 
other words, it will not yield any wielding criteria which would 
allow us to place substantive limits for that which is acceptable or 
legitimate within the realm of law. All it undoubtedly yields is 
the formal principIe of justice which is nothing but an application 
of the general principIe of consistency: like are to be treated alike, 
and unlike are to be treated differently. And if we place this 
principIe in context with law, it is quite possible even to c1aim 
that in a way no law can ever be at odds with it. For laws are by 
definition general rules which determine how certain kinds of 
people in certain kinds of situations ought to be treated, and if 
persons who match the relevant legal criteria are consistently 
treated in the way the law stipulates, they will by definition be 
treated alike, i. e. equally according to the law. Hence it is quite 
obvious that even a blatantly unjust or evil law can meet the 
requirements of the justice under scrutiny as long as it it is a 
formally sound piece of legislation. At this point the discussion 
will necessarily (sic) take a tum to a famous episode of the 20th 
century discourse on legal philosophy in which Hart played a 
part, too: Lon Fuller's theory on law and morality49. 
48. Op. cit., p. 202. 
49. See Lon FULLER, The Morality of Law, Yale University Press, New 
Raven (CT) 1965. 
THE CONCEPT AND MORALITY OF LA W 199 
3. THE INTERNAL MORALITY OF LA W? 
The famous difference between Hart and Fuller had moralistic 
undertones which reflected their different scientific inclinations 
and the way they reacted to the equally (in)famous "perpetual 
recurrence" of Natural Law doctrine, once again recurring after 
W orld War 11. Where Hart believed that the best way to prevent 
something like that from happening would be to deny that nature 
determines the boundaries of what can be the content of valid 
law50, Fuller thought that it was imperative to find a way of 
showing how nature herself would put a stop to tyrannies if only 
she were given the appropriate authority which belongs to her51 . 
This basic attitude brought him to construe a theory of law with 
which he wanted to show that, contrary to being infertile that very 
connection between law and morality which even Hart admitted 
was necessary, viz. the one via the formal characteristics essential 
for law, constituted a basis for a morality which was not only 
"interna!" to the law and thereby part of the very concept of law, 
but also a source for applications which would circumscribe the 
scope of the legitimate material content of the legal order. 
Fuller introduces his problematic with a distinction between a 
morality of duty, and a morality of aspiration52. He argues that a 
morality of aspiration which strives for perfection in legality is 
relevant for law53 . He is clearly inclined towards an intensional 
notion of "concept" when he holds that the concept "law" 
requires of real laws that they meet a certain standard of legal 
perfection, or an ideal norm of lawlikeness. He explains what he 
has in mind by telling a tale about an unhappy king named Rex 
who sets out to organize his realm with law. Thereby he makes a 
row of mistakes which teach him step by step what is the 
50. See HART, op. cit., p. 203 pp. 
51. See FULLER, op. cit., p. 152-186. 
52. Op. cit., p. 3 pp. 
53. lbidem p. 41 pp. 
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appropriate way in which laws are to be drafted, promulgated and 
administered. While he learns from his own mistakes, Rex comes 
to realize the importance of the following considerations: 1) Laws 
must be genera¡54. 2) Laws must be promulgated55. 3) Laws must 
be prospective, not retroactive56. 4). Laws must be c1ear57. 5) 
Laws must be consistent and mutually compatible58. 6) Laws 
must not require the impossible59. 7) Laws must remain constant 
over time60. 8) The application of rules by officials must be 
congruent with the rules61 . Fuller uses a Dickensian metaphor to 
make his point: if the legal order fails to meet one or several of 
these criteria of lawlikeness, it is to that extent not a legal order in 
the proper sense of the word, "except perhaps in the Pickwickian 
sen se in which a void contract can still be said to be one kind of 
contract"62. The eight requirements constitute an "internal 
morality of law" which every law must respect in order to be law 
at all. 
Now it may appear too much to say that a law which fails to 
meet one of the requirements is thereby no law at all. Clearly it is 
an imperfect law, but it may seem to make more sense to put it in 
the way John Finnis suggests: "law" has a focal meaning which 
inc1udes a set of criteria which laws must meet in order to be laws 
properly speaking, while laws which fail to meet sorne criteria but 
still meet others are laws in sorne lirnited particular sense63. 
54. P. 34 & p. 46 pp. 
55. P. 35 & p. 49 pp. 
56. P. 35 & p. 51 pp. 
57. P. 36 & p. 63 pp. 
58. P. 36 & p. 65 pp. 
59. P. 36 p. &p. 70 pp. 
60. P. 37 & p. 79 pp. 
61. P. 38 & p. 81 pp. 
62. P.39. 
63. FINNIS, op. supra cit, p. 277; This is a play with the Aristotelian 
distinction between "simply" and "in a sense": "good simply" requires all and 
"evil simply" comes with one fault, but that which is "evil simply" can still be 
"good in a sense". Thus there is no difference between Fuller and Finnis. 
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Whatever the case, Fuller's requirements seem on first sight 
designed to secure the effectivity of law: in order for the legal 
order to accomplish its task, it must abide by all these 
requirements, for which one may well adopt the shorthand 
expression "the rule of law". Efficiency is an undramatic 
requirement, and many others have demanded that laws must be 
efficient or efficacious in order to make good sense64. But if this 
is the case, it is difficult to see how Fuller's view is any different 
from Hart's, who -as we remember- also says that it is necessary 
for laws to meet the basic requirements of formal · justice but 
claims that this is a meagre basis for a necessary connection 
between law and morality because it is compatible with very 
great iniquity. The difference, as Fuller sees it, lies in that there 
are certain substantive ends which it is impossible to promote 
with laws without comprornising the "internal morality" which 
gives expression for an aspiration towards perfect lawlikeness65. 
His belief appears to be that a scrupulous respect for the "internal 
morality" will increase the likelihood of justice in the legal 
order66. This is at least what his appeal to historical evidence67 
seems to suggest. And if we take Fuller's requirements as 
necessary prerequisites for making law at aH, then they will 
obviously be necessary prerequisites for any reasonable law-
making, too. But if they are to have significant material 
64. Let me only mentíon J. M. BOUKEMA, Good Law. Towards a Rational 
Lawmaking Process, Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M., 1982, p. 53 pp., idem, 
"Criteria for Good Law", in Das Naturrechtsdenken heute und morgen. 
Gedachtnissschrift für Réné Marcic (ed. Dorothea Mayer-Maly & Peter M. 
Simons), Duncker und Humblot, Berlin 198, (pp. 713-724), p. 714 pp.; and 
Ake FRÁNDBERG, "Sorne Aspects on Ratíonality in Legislation", in 
Rechtstheorie Beiheft 8: Juristische Logik, Rationalittit und Irrationalittit im 
Recht (pp. 123-138), see p. 129 & 133. 
65. FULLER, op. cit., p. 153 pp. 
66. A similar idea governs Aulis Aarnio's version of the discursive 
approach to legal reasoning: see AARNIO, Lo racional como razonable, Centro 
de Estudios Constitucionales, Madrid, 1991, pp. 35-43. 
67. P. 154. 
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applications where the substantive content of the laws is 
concerned, they have to be sought in the light of a dictum which 
Fuller pronounces when he says that his "inner morality" has an 
inbuilt view of man as "a responsible agent"68. This notion allows 
us to stake a step further: from the aspiration of law to perfect 
"lawlikeness" to the aspiration of law as an enterprise for human 
order to a perfect "humanness" or "humaneness". 
As a human order, the legal enterprise intends to regulate the 
behavior of human beings. In principIe, one can attempt to do this 
in two philosophically divergent ways: One way is to manipulate 
the subjects without their rational co-operation, as if they were 
cattle and not responsible agents or autonomous rational persons 
with an ability to direct their own actions in a reasonable manner. 
This is like the Macchiavellian approach to government, or also 
that of a totalitarian tyranny, or of a modern "liberal" state which 
uses economic incentives to manipulate the citizens. The other 
way is to ask for the citizens' co-operation, assuming that they are 
responsible agents and autonomous persons with a mind to acting 
reasonably even on their own initiative. This is like the 
Aristotelian approach to government, or that of a state which 
trusts traditional legislation, or government by the rule of law, 
relying on the citizens to make up their minds that it is reasonable 
to abide by the requirements of the law for the common good of 
everyone. Now what Fuller appers to point at is that if a legal 
order directly violates the "internal morality", it will at least in 
sorne cases be thereby repugnant to the "responsible agent" -view 
of man, and consequently inhuman. 
Let us look at Fuller's "internal morality" step by step: To. 
begin with, he says laws must be general. This insight relates to 
the "responsible agent" argument in that it is a way of respecting 
the autonomy of the citizens not to direct their behaviour by 
individual and particular ad hoc orders or cornmands but by 
68. P. 162 pp. 
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telling them in abstract terms what is expected of them as rational 
agents and relying on their good sen se to adjust their actions to 
the general rules (given that they are reasonable). But this is 
nothing but a rendering of the original Aristotelian view 
according to which it was proper for slaves to be govemed 
despotically, so that their actions will be not their own but th<?se 
of their master, whereas free and equal citizens are to be govemed 
by appealing to their reason and by letting them govem 
themselves69. -Secondly, that laws must be promulgated is not 
merely a pragmatic point: it has a relationship with "reponsible 
agency" in that it makes sense to manipulate people with secret 
regulations only if it does not matter whether they make up their 
own minds to act as required or not. In Aristotelian terms, it is 
possible to appeal to someone's reason only if one lets him know 
what is wanted of him. Where this not the case, the "legal order" 
would be Kafkaesque at best. -AIso the fourth and fifth 
requirements conceming clarity and consistency can be 
interpreted in the same way: that the valid rules are sufficiently 
clear and consistent for the citizens to understand in a univocal 
manner is an obvious prerequisite for their informed and 
autonomous self-govemment according to intemalized rules. -A 
similar point can be made about Fuller's third requirement, too: 
retroactive legislation is quite obviously not interested in 
"responsible agency" inasmuch as it imposes a rule on past 
actions rather than future ones. A lawgiver drafting a retro active 
law is only interested in the measurable results -whatever they 
are- of the "legislation", and it makes no difference to him 
whether these results are a consequence of autonomous and 
informed civil obedience. 
The way in which the sixth requirement, that laws are not to 
require the impossible, relates to "responsible agency" is evident. 
The seventh, that laws should remain constant over time, bears an 
69. See Polit. 1,5-7. 
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equally obvious relation to it: in order for the citizens to be able 
to act according the law they have the right to expect that they 
can base their choices on a reasonably reliable knowledge about 
the foreseeable future. Otherwise their choice s will not be 
genuinely informed. Moreover, it is to-day a widespread problem 
all over the enlightened West that laws are simply too many, new 
laws being passed all the time, and old ones being amended 
"whenever something occurs for the better"70, so that it is 
practically impossible for ordinary citizens to follow the 
development at all. In such a political community, "responsible 
agency" under law is at best a beautiful fiction. The same can be 
said about such a political community, too, which violates 
Fuller's last requirement according to which it is imperative that 
both government and judiciary abide by the valid laws: if it is 
impossible for the citizens to know how officials will react to 
their choices, it is clearly not their "responsible" obedience which 
counts, but the opportunistic government -or its opportunistic 
officials- will utilize them for various purposes according to the 
demand of the situation. There is indeed an important difference 
in whether the government directs civil behaviour for the 
common good of everyone -or for the convenience of the 
government. 
4. DISCOURSE AND DEMOCRACY 
On the basis of what we have said aboye, the logical step to 
take would seem to lead us to an Aristotelian conception of law in 
the service of civil freedom. I trust that I have no need to explain 
the details of this conception to the readers of this journal. Let me 
only point out that it builds on a conception of man as a rational 
and a socialcreature with an internal entelechy which propels 
70. See Summa theologia: la Ha: 97,2. 
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him towards perfection. This perfection consists in perfect 
rationality and perfect sociability, which can -if we look away 
from theoría, the most perfect perfection of rational activity 
which can only be achieved by the few- only actualize in a 
perfect cornmunity -the polis- which teaches the citizens to 
govem themselves and each other perfectly with the rule of their 
reason. If the political cornmunity is conceived of like this, that it 
is a means to perfecting human nature in individuals, then also 
the methods it employs for the purpose of "making men good"71 
must be geared towards the same end. It follows, in the first 
place, that laws -which meet at least the criteria proposed by 
Fuller- are the only legitimate way of directing the citizen's 
choices because they are the only method which respects the 
status of the citizens as free and responsible, autonomous agents 
whose task is to govem themselves and oneanother. But quite 
c1early something must also be required from the material content 
of the laws if they are to promote the citizens' capacity for self-
government: as a modem version of the Aristotelian theory puts 
it, laws must be compatible with the principIe of subsidiarity 
which accords primary responsibility for the common good to the 
citizens themselves and only secondary responsibility to the 
govemment inasmuch as the citizens are not in a position to act 
properly on their own72. 
Now for many modems this way of looking at things is 
distasteful because it commits the sin of "es sentialism" , i.e. 
conceives of the concept of "concept" in an intensional manner as 
it accords things a purpose based on their essential function 
within the universe of things. We have no space in this context to 
review the reasons which have led many to adopt a worldview 
which denies that things have a point and purpose which is part 
and parcel of their being the things they are. In the 20th century 
71. See Eth. Nic. 11,1 (1103b3) and Summa theologia: la 1Ia: 92,1. 
72. For a discussion, see RENTIO, "Leisure, Self-Reliance, and the 
Family", in Persona y Derecho 40 (1999*), p. 683-711. 
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those reasons have appeared overwhelmingly compelling to 
many, even so much that one has felt no serious need to 
demonstrate why the essentialist view is wrong. Here we shall 
only take up one strategy which in the 20th century offered an 
increasingly popular promise that one could thereby avoid an 
outdated essentialism but at the same time maintain the view that 
there is a necessary connection between law and morality which 
goes far beyond the Hartian minimum, even much farther than 
Fuller perhaps envisaged when he wrote his own account. The 
source for this promise is the discursive theory of practical and 
legal reasoning, exemplified by names like Habermas, Alexy and 
Nino. 
The fundemental idea on which the discursive school of the 
Habermasian fold is based is that society consists in 
communication between its members. The social institutions, 
including laws, are a result of this communication. In order to 
achieve good results, the communication should take place under 
given ideal circumstances which allow and ensure free 
participation under equal conditions for all members of society, 
and follow a given set of rules which reflect the requirements of 
rational and reasonable discourse. The discourse will arrive at 
morally justified conclusions if it meets the principIe of 
universalizability which requires that every participant to the 
discourse should be freely willing to accept that the conclusion, 
e.g. a piece of new legislation, is in his own interest, too 73. Robert 
Alexy, a disciple of Habermas, has applied the Habermasian 
notions on juridical reasoning, which he sees as a special case 
("Sonderfall") for the general practical reasoning conducted on 
the poli tic al level of society 74. In this way, if practical reasoning 
at large has a necessary connection to morality, then juridical 
reasoning must necessarily be moral, too, as it is nothing but a 
73. For a discussion and slightly divergent view, see AARNIO, op. supra 
cit., p. 243 pp. 
74. ALEXY, op. supra cit., p. 261 pp. 
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special kind of practical reasoning. This train of thought has been 
developed in an original manner by Carlos Santiago Nino 
precisely in order to show why, despite his belief that there is no 
necessary conceptual connection between law and morality, they 
are nevertheless necessarily related as different kinds of discourse 
with a common fundament, or different instantiations of one and 
the same metadiscourse, as it were 75. 
Nino's starting point is that it is impossible for even an 
external ~bserver to understand a legal order without unders-
tanding the internal point of view of those who are subjects to 
that legal order76. In other words, understanding it presupposes 
knowing why these subjects consider it a binding legal order. 
And the foundation for this internal point of view, Nino claims, is 
the practical discourse which has evolved and become the 
principal mode of reproduction and intersubjective (re)for-
mulation of morality in the post-Renaissance West77. Without 
knowing this practical discourse one cannot know the law and 
tlllderstand its evolution. And without the practical discourse 
which underlies the internal point of view there cannot even be 
law which an external observer could observe78. The fact that in 
order to identify the law one must identify the basis of its 
authority shows that extralegal reference is necessary for that 
purpose79. For Nino, this authority is based on the law being 
compatible with the interests of everyone, which in turn implies 
that they must be a matter of critical discussion between all 
members of society, including the lawgiver, the judiciary, and the 
ordinary subjects. And this, according to Nino, is equivalent with 
75. See NINO, op. cit., p. 43 pp. 
76. P. 43 pp. 
77. P. 49 p. 
78. P.47 . 
79. P. 50 pp. 
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their being a moral matter80. Practical examples confirm81 that 
the law is not an isolated phenomenon: it is impossible to conduct 
a juridical discourse without taking recourse to a wider non-
juridical discourse -which is a moral discourse conceming the 
justification of the authoritative premisses of the juridical 
discourse82. In this way the juridical discourse seems to be a 
special case of the wider moral discourse pretty much in the same 
way as Alexy has suggested. 
But morality is not merely necessary for justifying the law, it 
is necessary for interpreting it, to083 . Nino puts it rather nicely 
that laws -as the prescriptions they are- are over1y crude and 
unbending to use as materials in a tr;ün of reasoning leading to 
their application: for use in practical reasoning they must be 
transformed into interpretative propositions about their relevance 
and content84. Nino goes on to analyze different phases, steps or 
aspects of the process of interpretation, and finds in every case 
that it is impossible to carry out these steps without resorting to 
reasons which are moral in the sen se defined above85. But these 
reasons need not refer to any objective substantive moral content: 
that they refer to a discourse which can be characterized as moral 
suffices to make them moral reasons86. 
80. P. 59. Note that Nino conceives of "morality" explicitly in the 
predominant modern way of understanding morality as that aspect of practical 
reasoning which has to do with how individuals treat each other. For more 
details, see his discussion on prudential and moral reasoning, p. 80 p. His is 
nevertheless not the only way, and not necessarly the best way, in which 
morality can be conceived of, and it is therefore one of the weak points in 
Nino's argument. 
81. P. 60 pp. 
82. P_ 79 pp. 
83. P. 84 pp. 
84. P.85 . 
. 85. P. 87 pp. As Nino points out, "scientifically" value-free legal 
dogmatics is often merely a misleading camouflage for underlying evaluations 
which one wants to hide; see p. 100 pp. 
86. P.128p. 
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The fact that laws cannot be justified or interpreted without 
reference to morality appears to give reason to doubt the 
usefulness of law in the first place: If the law cannot justify itself, 
and if its interpretation to a great deal depends on moral reasons, 
why should we have law at aH? Would not morality be enough 
for the purposes of society?87 Nino thinks this is not the case 
because legal actions and legal decisions are not isolated 
individual actions or decisions, but collective in that they are part 
and parcel of a process of social interaction in which aH members 
of the society participate and which extends from the past via the 
present to the future88. Law is not a matter for each citizen on his 
own, but for aH citizens as a coHective. This makes it possible for 
Nino to make a functional difference . between justice in an 
individual case of applying the law and justice on the level of the 
entire coHective practice of juridicaldiscourse: it may be 
important to protect and maintain the coHective practice even at 
the cost of justice in particular cases if it can be shown that 
keeping up the present juridical order is the most legitimate 
alternative for the society in question among the realistic options 
it has: a "second best" order may be worth maintaining ifaH the 
other realistic alternatives are even worse89. With examples 
drawn fromgame theory Nino proceeds to argue that if the legal 
order depends on external sanctions and prudential adherence 
alone, it will not succeed weH in its function to facilitate social 
87. 130 pp . 
. 88. P. 134 pp.; The notion of collective action is open to criticism because 
it is counterintuitive in the sen se that what people generally expect from the 
law, when they actually are involved in a legal process, is personal justice and 
not sorne abstract collective good. It istrue that e.g. the judiciary must in its 
activity take into account the possible prejudicial effect of its judgments, but 
this is never the whole story: the primary purpose of law is to lend justice to the 
parties if the case under litigation. 
89. P. 140 pp.; Cf. St. Thomas' notion according to which one may have to 
abide by a law which is unjust because disobedience would cause "scandal or 
disturbance", mentioned in footnote 41 aboye. 
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cooperation90_ For success, sanctions must be coupled with a 
moral authority which makes the citizens accept the law, or to 
intemálize it, not merely as a matter of prudence but also asa 
moral obligation_ In this way Nino tums upside down Alexy's 
idea according to which it is an aspect of a necessary relationship 
between law and morality that morality needs the support of legal 
sanctions in order to be able to organize society91: on the 
contrary, it is the legal sanctions which for Nino require the 
support of morality in order to work properly. 
Having conc1uded that moral legitimacy ís a necessary 
prerequisite for the success of a legal order in performing its task 
of social organization, Nino finally tums to a discussion on what 
possibly may be the proper foundation for the legitimacy in 
question92. His favourite moral theory is discursive morality, 
because it allows one to surpass the problems of moral 
subjectivism without stagnating the moral order: while an 
ongoing moral discourse which guarantees rational discussion 
lets one arrive at definite intersubjective solutions, it will at the 
same time remain open for new rounds of discussion which can 
yield different outcomes93. An ideal discussion is impartial, 
universal and public, among other things, and Nino -not entirely 
unlike Fuller- believes that the requirements of ideal discourse, 
even if they are in themselves strictly formal, will establish a 
number of moral principIes with material relevance, viz. the 
principIes of respect for personal autonomy, inviolability, and 
dignity94. But the problem still remains that it is not self-evident 
that a moral discourse ought to be like the one envisaged by 
90. P. 148 pp_ ; Again the adoption of game theory as an unquestioned basis 
for argument is open to criticism from other worldviews which do not accept 
the rather selfish and calculative view of man on which game theory depends_ 
91. See aboye at footnote 26_ 
92. P. 161 pp. 
93. P. 166 pp_ 
94. P. 170 p. 
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Nino. Besides, it is still compatible with an individualistic moral 
elitism, which he finds distasteful and chooses a collectivist 
approach which holds that morality is not a matter for each as an 
individual but for all as a collectivity. As a collective process, an 
open and fair moral discourse is the nearest approximation to 
universal impartiality which can be reached in a society. As such, 
it promises a high probability of yielding right solutions. Thereby 
it has the advantage of at once allowing for the possibility that 
maybe the solutions it yields are not absolutely right, but still 
providing a good reason to accept them as if they were right, 
because all the odds are that there is no better way of finding out 
what precisely are the right solutions95 . 
The obvious step to take now is to point out that democracy 
seems to be a way of actualizing a kind of fair and open 
discourse, or a "second best" substitute for it, which may meet at 
least sorne of the requirements of ideal discourse and thereby 
ensure a reasonable probability that its outcomes will on the 
whole be the best ones a society can reach by any realistic 
means96. But not any conception of democracy will do: A 
necessary distinction must be made between the personal interests 
of each citizen and the impersonal interests of the citizens as a 
collective. Given the competitive nature of social interaction -
illustrated by game theory- only a democracy which can in the 
eyes of the citizens justify a sufficient degree of transformation of 
personal interests into legitimate impersonal interests can be an 
effective democracy and fulfil the function of government in a 
satisfactory manner. A number of different approaches have 
looked at democracy from this viewpoint. Nino discards the 
theories based on the notion of popular sovereignty, and the ones 
based on a perfectionism which holds that the task of civil society 
is to grow civil virtue, in order to put forward his favourite 
95. P. 173 pp. 
96. P. 177 pp. 
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altemative: a "deliberative conception" of democracy, based on 
his version of the theory of discourse97 _ A democracy like this 
will allow everyone to participate and to know the standpointof 
his fellows, participants do not merely seek to prevail by force or 
persuasion but to justify their standpoints publicly, their position 
will make it important for them to have sympathy for competing 
interests and to feel shame for promoting personal interests, an 
open debate will help to avoid errors, the majority principIes 
makes participants seek wide support for their proposals, and 
thereby the probability that democractic decisions will be fair is 
high98 _ If this is so, then the sheer fact that a decision has been 
made democratically is a reason against disobeying it even if one 
knew for sure that it is a wrong decision, given the fact that the 
democracy in question, despite all its shortcomings, , still is the 
best available way of making decisions for the relevant society99_ 
This, for Nino, constitutes the ultimate moral foundation for law: 
in order for laws to be legitimate qua laws, they ought to be 
democratic, because democratic discourse, by being the fairest 
availab1e method for politics, justifies the way in which personal 
interestsare by the laws subjected to the impersonal interest of 
the collectivity. If democratic laws are disobeyed, the social order 
is in danger of disintegration. Quod erat demonstrandum. 
5. TOWARDS A CONCLUSION 
It remains to be asked whether Nino accomplishes with his 
ingenious argument a result which were essentially (sic) different 
from Hart's and Fuller's? I think not.For what Nino succeeds irt 
doing is showing that it is impossible for , the legal order to 
function without reference to morality. This, as we recall, was the 
97. P. 182 pp. 
98. P. 184 pp. 
99. P. 187 pp. 
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basic tenet of both Hart and Fuller, too. Towards the end of his 
exposition Nino merely makes the material corollaries of his 
formal requirements somewhat more explicit than his 
predecessors. Where Fuller was satisfied with pointing out that 
his "internal morality" would prec1ude sorne ways of violating 
the personal integrity of the citizens, Nino explains the 
mechanism in more detail and shows why even a deficient social 
practice of democratic poli tic al discourse will make the legal 
order meet a reasonable standard of moral legitimacy. In this 
respect Nino appears to follow Aristotle's famous dictum in 
which he points out that even if individual citizens are not very 
wise, it is quite possible that wisdom will accrue when the 
citizens join their forces in deliberating public issueslOO. But all 
this leaves open the final question: what is the point of it aH? 
Why is it important that personal autonomy, inviolability and 
dignity be respected? For Nino seems to hold that these 
considerations, which presumably would on the one hand justify 
the value of democracy as the best available source for 
legislation, follow on the other hand by definition from his 
requirements of ideal discourse. Clearly this is a petitio principii 
if any. 
What we need instead is a consideration which shows why it is 
a good idea to adopt a notion of ideal discourse which yields 
precisely those values. We need to know why democracy, or the 
law, is good for uso By far the most promising alternative which 
can provide such a justification both for democracy and for law is 
precise1y the one Nino discards in one sentence: perfectionism. 
Only a perfectionistic theory which can show how it makes a 
difference for every citizen morally to be subject to a democratic 
legal order can lend it an ultimate moral point, sense and 
justification. Nino discards "essentialism" by pointing out that 
social institutions are conventions, whereby they cannot be 
100. See Polit. m,lI (1281a39-blO). 
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instantiations of any essences given to us independently of our 
conventions. We should nevertheless notice that the fundamental 
strategy of "essentialism" is not to maintain that institutions, like 
the law, have an abstract moral essence which they ought to meet: 
the proper "essentialist" tenet is that the human being has a moral 
essence, and that the human institutions ought to meet. the 
requirements of that human essense. A good example is the 
Aristotelian theory according to which the essence of man is to 
grow to a moral and political perfection which can only be 
attained in a political community. Given such a starting point, 
democracy has a meaningful purpose because it helps citizens to 
grow to that perfection, and the legal order makes sense because 
it is the only legitimate way in which the political community can 
be governed in order to facilitate the growth of the citizens to the 
perfection which is their essential end. 
An important motive which has prompted authors like Nino 
and Hart to discard "essentialism" is their belief that if it is 
accepted that "law" has a moral essence, it will necessarily follow 
that the content of the legal order is somehow materially 
predetermined and thereby in principIe unchangeable10l . But 
already Aquinas made it very clear that a theory of law which is 
based on an essentialistic conception of morality does not 
necessarily imply such a predetermination102. If we step back 
from Aquinas to the original Aristotelian theory of natural 
morality, politics and law -which is the mother of all 
101. Christoph GUSY, Legitimitiit im demokratischen Pluralismus, Franz 
Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1987, is an examplary representative of this attitude 
when he argues that if the legitimate material content of the law is moraHy 
limited, democratic legislation makes little sen se, because lawmaking is not 
then a creative activity at aH but a simple matter of finding out what natural 
morality prescribes and positivizing those prescriptions by translating them into 
the language of law; see in particular pp. 62-76. A very similar notion is 
apparendy implicit in Nino's argument, too, even though he does not take it up 
as a central theme in his exposition. 
102. la IIre 95, 2. 
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essentialisms in this respect- we can c1early see how it leads us to 
a position according to which, yes, the purpose of the law is to 
make men good, i.e. virtuous, but this civil virtue is in the last 
analysis equivalent to a capacity for moral and political self-
control which is equivalent to moral and political freedom and 
therefore in an important manner incompatible with every idea of 
imposing a predetermined material morality on the citizens. The 
task of the Aristotelian state and of its legal order is on the 
contrary to help the citizens to reach an autonomous position of 
mutual self-government. The crucial difference with moderns like 
Nino is that the law is not for the purpose of serving interests103, 
be they personal or impersonal, but for the good of the citizens. 
This difference brings us to the problem of moral motivation: In 
that respect the Aristotelian essentialism is capable of showing 
how the law can genuinely be for the cornmon good of aH even if 
it may be against the interests of sorne: the good it seeks is moral, 
and the interests it sacrifices are merely material, and there can be 
no conflict between the good of one individual citizen and 
another, as one's being a good citizen in no way diminishes the 
chances of the other being a good citizen, too. 
For Nino, again, there seems to be no good which is separate 
from interests, and aH he can show is why a more sophisticated 
calculus of interests may motivate the citizens to sacrifice sorne 
of their immediate personal interests for sorne more remote 
general interest in which they have a share and by which they can 
hope to win a greater interest satisfaction in the long runo 1 do not 
see how such a step can genuinely remove the problem of 
motivation for the citizens' aHegiance to the outcoming legal 
order: it will still continue to depend on a calculus of probable 
interests-satisfaction -unless one can show why, ultimately, each 
citizen plausibly has good reason to prefer his good for his 
interest. And 1 do not see how else one could have such a good 
103. See op. cit., p. 180 pp. 
216 JUHA-PEKKA RENITO 
reason, unless one realized that it made one a better persono Such 
a judgment, again, is feasible only on the assumption that we can 
tell what it consists in to be a good persono And that we can only 
do if we as sume a human essence with a moral standard of 
excellence. 
In just a few words, then, the law seems to be an essentially 
moral institution because of the very fact that it is a human 
institution: its very point is to make human life more excellent, 
otherwise there would be no point in instituting it in the first 
place. I do not think anyone can avoid making implicit reference 
to sorne conception of such excellence when one evaluates the 
meaning of law for human society. Such a conception surely 
underlies every non-"essentialist" theory, too. The trouble is only 
that a non-"essentialist" will not make his conception of human 
excellence an explicit issue, thanks to his adopted cornmitment 
precisely to non-"essentialism". Thereby he is bound to make the 
same mistake which Nino accuses those legal dogmatists for104 
who -while there is no way in which they can really purge their 
activity from implicit reference to moral considerations- will 
explicitly deny any such reference as something "unscientific". 
104. Op. cit., p. 105. 
